Offline Ed25519 OpenPGP key with subkeys on FST-01G running Gnuk

Below I describe how to generate an OpenPGP key and import it to a FST-01G device running Gnuk. See my earlier post on planning for my new OpenPGP key and the post on preparing the FST-01G to run Gnuk. For comparison with a RSA/YubiKey based approach, you can read about my setup from 2014.

Most of the steps below are covered by the Gnuk manual. The primary complication for me is the use of a offline machine and storing GnuPG directory stored on a USB memory device.

Offline machine

I use a laptop that is not connected to the Internet and boot it from a read-only USB memory stick. Finding a live CD that contains the necessary tools for using GnuPG with smartcards (gpg-agent, scdaemon, pcscd) is significantly harder than it should be. Using a rarely audited image begs the question of whether you can trust it. A patched kernel/gpg to generate poor randomness would be an easy and hard to notice hack. I’m using the PGP/PKI Clean Room Live CD. Recommendations on more widely used and audited alternatives would be appreciated. Select “Advanced Options” and “Run Shell” to escape the menus. Insert a new USB memory device, and prepare it as follows:

pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ sudo wipefs -a /dev/sdX
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ sudo fdisk /dev/sdX
# create a primary partition of Linux type
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ sudo mkfs.ext4 /dev/sdX1
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ sudo mount /dev/sdX1 /mnt
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ sudo mkdir /mnt/gnupghome
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ sudo chown pgp.pgp /mnt/gnupghome
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ sudo chmod go-rwx /mnt/gnupghome

GnuPG configuration

Set your GnuPG home directory to point to the gnupghome directory on the USB memory device. You will need to do this in every terminal windows you open that you want to use GnuPG in.

pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ export GNUPGHOME=/mnt/gnupghome
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$

At this point, you should be able to run gpg --card-status and get output from the smartcard.

Create master key

Create a master key and make a backup copy of the GnuPG home directory with it, together with an export ASCII version.

pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ gpg --quick-gen-key "Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>" ed25519 sign 216d
gpg: keybox '/mnt/gnupghome/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: /mnt/gnupghome/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key D73CF638C53C06BE marked as ultimately trusted
gpg: directory '/mnt/gnupghome/openpgp-revocs.d' created
gpg: revocation certificate stored as '/mnt/gnupghome/openpgp-revocs.d/B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE.rev'
pub   ed25519 2019-03-20 [SC] [expires: 2019-10-22]
      B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE
      B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE
uid                      Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>

pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ gpg -a --export-secret-keys B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE > $GNUPGHOME/masterkey.txt
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ sudo cp -a $GNUPGHOME $GNUPGHOME-backup-masterkey
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ 

Create subkeys

Create subkeys and make a backup of them too, as follows.

pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ gpg --quick-add-key B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE cv25519 encr 216d
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ gpg --quick-add-key B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE ed25519 auth 216d
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ gpg --quick-add-key B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE ed25519 sign 216d
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ gpg -a --export-secret-keys B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE > $GNUPGHOME/mastersubkeys.txt
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ gpg -a --export-secret-subkeys B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE > $GNUPGHOME/subkeys.txt
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ sudo cp -a $GNUPGHOME $GNUPGHOME-backup-mastersubkeys
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ 

Move keys to card

Prepare the card by setting Admin PIN, PIN, your full name, sex, login account, and key URL as you prefer, following the Gnuk manual on card personalization.

Move the subkeys from your GnuPG keyring to the FST01G using the keytocard command.

Take a final backup — because moving the subkeys to the card modifes the local GnuPG keyring — and create a ASCII armored version of the public key, to be transferred to your daily machine.

pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ gpg --list-secret-keys
/mnt/gnupghome/pubring.kbx
--------------------------
sec   ed25519 2019-03-20 [SC] [expires: 2019-10-22]
      B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE
uid           [ultimate] Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
ssb>  cv25519 2019-03-20 [E] [expires: 2019-10-22]
ssb>  ed25519 2019-03-20 [A] [expires: 2019-10-22]
ssb>  ed25519 2019-03-20 [S] [expires: 2019-10-22]

pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ gpg -a --export-secret-keys B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE > $GNUPGHOME/masterstubs.txt
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ gpg -a --export-secret-subkeys B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE > $GNUPGHOME/subkeysstubs.txt
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ gpg -a --export B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE > $GNUPGHOME/publickey.txt
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ cp -a $GNUPGHOME $GNUPGHOME-backup-masterstubs
pgp@pgplive:/home/pgp$ 

Transfer to daily machine

Copy publickey.txt to your day-to-day laptop and import it and create stubs using --card-status.

jas@latte:~$ gpg --import < publickey.txt 
gpg: key D73CF638C53C06BE: public key "Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:               imported: 1
jas@latte:~$ gpg --card-status

Reader ...........: Free Software Initiative of Japan Gnuk (FSIJ-1.2.14-67252015) 00 00
Application ID ...: D276000124010200FFFE672520150000
Version ..........: 2.0
Manufacturer .....: unmanaged S/N range
Serial number ....: 67252015
Name of cardholder: Simon Josefsson
Language prefs ...: sv
Sex ..............: male
URL of public key : https://josefsson.org/key-20190320.txt
Login data .......: jas
Signature PIN ....: not forced
Key attributes ...: ed25519 cv25519 ed25519
Max. PIN lengths .: 127 127 127
PIN retry counter : 3 3 3
Signature counter : 0
Signature key ....: A3CC 9C87 0B9D 310A BAD4  CF2F 5172 2B08 FE47 45A2
      created ....: 2019-03-20 23:40:49
Encryption key....: A9EC 8F4D 7F1E 50ED 3DEF  49A9 0292 3D7E E76E BD60
      created ....: 2019-03-20 23:40:26
Authentication key: CA7E 3716 4342 DF31 33DF  3497 8026 0EE8 A9B9 2B2B
      created ....: 2019-03-20 23:40:37
General key info..: sub  ed25519/51722B08FE4745A2 2019-03-20 Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
sec   ed25519/D73CF638C53C06BE  created: 2019-03-20  expires: 2019-10-22
ssb>  cv25519/02923D7EE76EBD60  created: 2019-03-20  expires: 2019-10-22
                                card-no: FFFE 67252015
ssb>  ed25519/80260EE8A9B92B2B  created: 2019-03-20  expires: 2019-10-22
                                card-no: FFFE 67252015
ssb>  ed25519/51722B08FE4745A2  created: 2019-03-20  expires: 2019-10-22
                                card-no: FFFE 67252015
jas@latte:~$ 

Before the key can be used after the import, you must update the trust database for the secret key.

Now you should have a offline master key with subkey stubs. Note in the output below that the master key is not available (sec#) and the subkeys are stubs for smartcard keys (ssb>).

jas@latte:~$ gpg --list-secret-keys
sec#  ed25519 2019-03-20 [SC] [expires: 2019-10-22]
      B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE
uid           [ultimate] Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
ssb>  cv25519 2019-03-20 [E] [expires: 2019-10-22]
ssb>  ed25519 2019-03-20 [A] [expires: 2019-10-22]
ssb>  ed25519 2019-03-20 [S] [expires: 2019-10-22]

jas@latte:~$

If your environment variables are setup correctly, SSH should find the authentication key automatically.

jas@latte:~$ ssh-add -L
ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAILzCFcHHrKzVSPDDarZPYqn89H5TPaxwcORgRg+4DagE cardno:FFFE67252015
jas@latte:~$ 

GnuPG and SSH are now ready to be used with the new key. Thanks for reading!

Installing Gnuk on FST-01G running NeuG

The FST-01G device that you order from the FSF shop runs NeuG. To be able to use the device as a OpenPGP smartcard, you need to install Gnuk. While Niibe covers this on his tutorial, I found the steps a bit complicated to follow. The following guides you from buying the device to getting a FST-01G running Gnuk ready for use with GnuPG.

Once you have received the device and inserted it into a USB port, your kernel log (sudo dmesg) will show something like the following:

[628772.874658] usb 1-1.5.1: New USB device found, idVendor=234b, idProduct=0004
[628772.874663] usb 1-1.5.1: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3
[628772.874666] usb 1-1.5.1: Product: Fraucheky
[628772.874669] usb 1-1.5.1: Manufacturer: Free Software Initiative of Japan
[628772.874671] usb 1-1.5.1: SerialNumber: FSIJ-0.0
[628772.875204] usb-storage 1-1.5.1:1.0: USB Mass Storage device detected
[628772.875452] scsi host6: usb-storage 1-1.5.1:1.0
[628773.886539] scsi 6:0:0:0: Direct-Access     FSIJ     Fraucheky        1.0  PQ: 0 ANSI: 0
[628773.887522] sd 6:0:0:0: Attached scsi generic sg2 type 0
[628773.888931] sd 6:0:0:0: [sdb] 128 512-byte logical blocks: (65.5 kB/64.0 KiB)
[628773.889558] sd 6:0:0:0: [sdb] Write Protect is off
[628773.889564] sd 6:0:0:0: [sdb] Mode Sense: 03 00 00 00
[628773.890305] sd 6:0:0:0: [sdb] No Caching mode page found
[628773.890314] sd 6:0:0:0: [sdb] Assuming drive cache: write through
[628773.902617]  sdb:
[628773.906066] sd 6:0:0:0: [sdb] Attached SCSI removable disk

The device comes up as a USB mass storage device. Conveniently, it contain documentation describing what it is, and you identify the version of NeuG it runs as follows.

jas@latte:~/src/gnuk$ head /media/jas/Fraucheky/README 
NeuG - a true random number generator implementation (for STM32F103)

							  Version 1.0.7
							     2018-01-19
						           Niibe Yutaka
				      Free Software Initiative of Japan

To convert the device into the serial-mode that is required for the software upgrade, use the eject command for the device (above it came up as /dev/sdb): sudo eject /dev/sdb. The kernel log will now contain something like this:

[628966.847387] usb 1-1.5.1: reset full-speed USB device number 27 using ehci-pci
[628966.955723] usb 1-1.5.1: device firmware changed
[628966.956184] usb 1-1.5.1: USB disconnect, device number 27
[628967.115322] usb 1-1.5.1: new full-speed USB device number 28 using ehci-pci
[628967.233272] usb 1-1.5.1: New USB device found, idVendor=234b, idProduct=0001
[628967.233277] usb 1-1.5.1: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3
[628967.233280] usb 1-1.5.1: Product: NeuG True RNG
[628967.233283] usb 1-1.5.1: Manufacturer: Free Software Initiative of Japan
[628967.233286] usb 1-1.5.1: SerialNumber: FSIJ-1.0.7-67252015
[628967.234034] cdc_acm 1-1.5.1:1.0: ttyACM0: USB ACM device

The strings NeuG True RNG and FSIJ-1.0.7 suggest it is running NeuG version 1.0.7.

Now both Gnuk itself and reGNUal needs to be built, as follows. If you get any error message, you likely don’t have the necessary dependencies installed.

jas@latte:~/src$ git clone https://salsa.debian.org/gnuk-team/gnuk/neug.git
jas@latte:~/src$ git clone https://salsa.debian.org/gnuk-team/gnuk/gnuk.git
jas@latte:~/src$ cd gnuk/src/
jas@latte:~/src/gnuk/src$ git submodule update --init
jas@latte:~/src/gnuk/src$ ./configure --vidpid=234b:0000
...
jas@latte:~/src/gnuk/src$ make
...
jas@latte:~/src/gnuk/src$ cd ../regnual/
jas@latte:~/src/gnuk/regnual$ make
jas@latte:~/src/gnuk/regnual$ cd ../../

You are now ready to flash the device, as follows.

jas@latte:~/src$ sudo neug/tool/neug_upgrade.py -f gnuk/regnual/regnual.bin gnuk/src/build/gnuk.bin 
gnuk/regnual/regnual.bin: 4544
gnuk/src/build/gnuk.bin: 113664
CRC32: 931cab51

Device: 
Configuration: 1
Interface: 1
20000e00:20005000
Downloading flash upgrade program...
start 20000e00
end   20001f00
# 20001f00: 31 : 196
Run flash upgrade program...
Wait 3 seconds...
Device: 
08001000:08020000
Downloading the program
start 08001000
end   0801bc00
jas@latte:~/src$ 

Remove and insert the device and the kernel log should contain something like this:

[629120.399875] usb 1-1.5.1: new full-speed USB device number 32 using ehci-pci
[629120.511003] usb 1-1.5.1: New USB device found, idVendor=234b, idProduct=0000
[629120.511008] usb 1-1.5.1: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3
[629120.511011] usb 1-1.5.1: Product: Gnuk Token
[629120.511014] usb 1-1.5.1: Manufacturer: Free Software Initiative of Japan
[629120.511017] usb 1-1.5.1: SerialNumber: FSIJ-1.2.14-67252015

The device can now be used with GnuPG as a smartcard device.

jas@latte:~/src/gnuk$ gpg --card-status
Reader ...........: 234B:0000:FSIJ-1.2.14-67252015:0
Application ID ...: D276000124010200FFFE672520150000
Version ..........: 2.0
Manufacturer .....: unmanaged S/N range
Serial number ....: 67252015
Name of cardholder: [not set]
Language prefs ...: [not set]
Sex ..............: unspecified
URL of public key : [not set]
Login data .......: [not set]
Signature PIN ....: forced
Key attributes ...: rsa2048 rsa2048 rsa2048
Max. PIN lengths .: 127 127 127
PIN retry counter : 3 3 3
Signature counter : 0
Signature key ....: [none]
Encryption key....: [none]
Authentication key: [none]
General key info..: [none]
jas@latte:~/src/gnuk$ 

Congratulations!

OpenPGP 2019 Key Transition Statement

I have created a new OpenPGP key and will be transitioning away from my old key. If you have signed my old key, I would appreciate signatures on my new key as well. I have created a transition statement that can be downloaded from https://josefsson.org/key-transition-2019-03-20.txt.

Below is the signed statement.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

OpenPGP Key Transition Statement for Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>

I have created a new OpenPGP key and will be transitioning away from
my old key.  The old key has not been compromised and will continue to
be valid for some time, but I prefer all future correspondence to be
encrypted to the new key, and will be making signatures with the new
key going forward.

I would like this new key to be re-integrated into the web of trust.
This message is signed by both keys to certify the transition.  My new
and old keys are signed by each other.  If you have signed my old key,
I would appreciate signatures on my new key as well, provided that
your signing policy permits that without re-authenticating me.

The old key, which I am transitioning away from, is:

pub   rsa3744 2014-06-22 [SC]
      9AA9 BDB1 1BB1 B99A 2128  5A33 0664 A769 5426 5E8C

The new key, to which I am transitioning, is:

pub   ed25519 2019-03-20 [SC]
      B1D2 BD13 75BE CB78 4CF4  F8C4 D73C F638 C53C 06BE

The key may be downloaded from: https://josefsson.org/key-20190320.txt

To fetch the full new key from a public key server using GnuPG, run:

  gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net \
      --recv-key B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE

If you already know my old key, you can now verify that the new key is
signed by the old one:

  gpg --check-sigs B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE

If you are satisfied that you've got the right key, and the User IDs
match what you expect, I would appreciate it if you would sign my key:

  gpg --sign-key B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE

You can upload your signatures to a public keyserver directly:

  gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net \
      --send-key B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE

Or email simon@josefsson.org (possibly encrypted) the output from:

  gpg --armor --export B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE

If you'd like any further verification or have any questions about the
transition please contact me directly.

To verify the integrity of this statement:

  wget -q -O- https://josefsson.org/key-transition-2019-03-20.txt | gpg --verify

/Simon
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=r0qK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Planning for a new OpenPGP key

I’m the process of migrating to a new OpenPGP key. I have been using GnuPG with keys stored on external hardware (smartcards) for a long time, and I’m firmly committed to that choice. Algorithm wise, RSA was the best choice back for me when I created my key in 2002, and I used it successfully with a non-standard key size for many years. In 2014 it was time for me to move to a new stronger key, and I still settled on RSA and a non-standard key size. My master key was 3744 bits instead of 1280 bits, and the smartcard subkeys were 2048 bits instead of 1024 bits. At that time, I had already moved from the OpenPGP smartcard to the NXP-based YubiKey NEO (version 3) that runs JavaCard applets. The primary relevant difference for me was the availability of source code for the OpenPGP implementation running on the device, in the ykneo-openpgp project. The device was still a proprietary hardware and firmware design though.

Five years later, it is time for a new key again, and I allow myself to revisit some decisions that I made last time.

GnuPG has supported Curve25519/Ed25519 for some time, and today I prefer it over RSA. Infrastructure has been gradually introducing support for it as well, to the point that I now believe I can cut the ropes to the old world with RSA. Having a offline master key is still a strong preference, so I will stick to that decision. You shouldn’t run around with your primary master key if it is possible to get by with subkeys for daily use, and that has worked well for me over the years.

Hardware smartcard support for Curve25519/Ed25519 has been behind software support. NIIBE Yutaka developed the FST-01 hardware device in 2011, and the more modern FST-01G device in 2016. He also wrote the Gnuk software implementation of the OpenPGP card specification that runs on the FST-01 hardware (and other devices). The FST-01 hardware design is open, and it only runs the Gnuk free software. You can buy the FST-01G device from the FSF. The device has not received the FSF Respects Your Freedom stamp, even though it is sold by FSF which seems a bit hypocritical. Hardware running Gnuk are the only free software OpenPGP smartcard that supports Curve25519/Ed25519 right now, to my knowledge. The physical form factor is not as slick as the YubiKey (especially the nano-versions of the YubiKey that can be emerged into the USB slot), but it is a trade-off I can live with. Niibe introduced the FST-01SZ at FOSDEM’19 but to me it does not appear to offer any feature over the FST-01G and is not available for online purchase right now.

I have always generated keys in software using GnuPG. My arguments traditionally was that I 1) don’t trust closed-source RSA key generation implementations, and 2) want to be able to reproduce my setup with a brand new device. With Gnuk the first argument doesn’t hold any longer. However, I still prefer to generate keys with GnuPG on a Linux-based Debian machine because that software stack is likely to receive more auditing than Gnuk. It is a delicated decision though, since GnuPG on Debian is many orders of complexity higher than the Gnuk software. My second argument is now the primary driver for this decision.

I prefer the SHA-2 family of hashes over SHA-1, and earlier had to configure GnuPG for this. Today I believe the defaults have been improved and this is no longer an issue.

Back in 2014, I had a goal of having a JPEG image embedded in my OpenPGP key. I never finished that process, and I have not been sorry for missing out on anything as a result. On the contrary, the size of the key with an embedded image woud have been even more problematic than the already large key holding 4 embedded RSA public keys in it.

To summarize, my requirements for my OpenPGP key setup in 2019 are:

  • Curve25519/Ed25519 algorithms.
  • Master key on USB stick.
  • USB stick only used on an offline computer.
  • Subkeys for daily use (signature, encryption and authentication).
  • Keys are generated in GnuPG software and imported to the smartcard.
  • Smartcard is open hardware and running free software.

Getting this setup up and running sadly requires quite some detailed work, which will be the topic of other posts… stay tuned!

OpenPGP smartcard under GNOME on Debian 9.0 Stretch

I installed Debian 9.0 “Stretch” on my Lenovo X201 laptop today. Installation went smooth, as usual. GnuPG/SSH with an OpenPGP smartcard — I use a YubiKey NEO — does not work out of the box with GNOME though. I wrote about how to fix OpenPGP smartcards under GNOME with Debian 8.0 “Jessie” earlier, and I thought I’d do a similar blog post for Debian 9.0 “Stretch”. The situation is slightly different than before (e.g., GnuPG works better but SSH doesn’t) so there is some progress. May I hope that Debian 10.0 “Buster” gets this right? Pointers to which package in Debian should have a bug report tracking this issue is welcome (or a pointer to an existing bug report).

After first login, I attempt to use gpg --card-status to check if GnuPG can talk to the smartcard.

jas@latte:~$ gpg --card-status
gpg: error getting version from 'scdaemon': No SmartCard daemon
gpg: OpenPGP card not available: No SmartCard daemon
jas@latte:~$ 

This fails because scdaemon is not installed. Isn’t a smartcard common enough so that this should be installed by default on a GNOME Desktop Debian installation? Anyway, install it as follows.

root@latte:~# apt-get install scdaemon

Then try again.

jas@latte:~$ gpg --card-status
gpg: selecting openpgp failed: No such device
gpg: OpenPGP card not available: No such device
jas@latte:~$ 

I believe scdaemon here attempts to use its internal CCID implementation, and I do not know why it does not work. At this point I often recall that want pcscd installed since I work with smartcards in general.

root@latte:~# apt-get install pcscd

Now gpg --card-status works!

jas@latte:~$ gpg --card-status

Reader ...........: Yubico Yubikey NEO CCID 00 00
Application ID ...: D2760001240102000006017403230000
Version ..........: 2.0
Manufacturer .....: Yubico
Serial number ....: 01740323
Name of cardholder: Simon Josefsson
Language prefs ...: sv
Sex ..............: male
URL of public key : https://josefsson.org/54265e8c.txt
Login data .......: jas
Signature PIN ....: not forced
Key attributes ...: rsa2048 rsa2048 rsa2048
Max. PIN lengths .: 127 127 127
PIN retry counter : 3 3 3
Signature counter : 8358
Signature key ....: 9941 5CE1 905D 0E55 A9F8  8026 860B 7FBB 32F8 119D
      created ....: 2014-06-22 19:19:04
Encryption key....: DC9F 9B7D 8831 692A A852  D95B 9535 162A 78EC D86B
      created ....: 2014-06-22 19:19:20
Authentication key: 2E08 856F 4B22 2148 A40A  3E45 AF66 08D7 36BA 8F9B
      created ....: 2014-06-22 19:19:41
General key info..: sub  rsa2048/860B7FBB32F8119D 2014-06-22 Simon Josefsson 
sec#  rsa3744/0664A76954265E8C  created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04
ssb>  rsa2048/860B7FBB32F8119D  created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04
                                card-no: 0006 01740323
ssb>  rsa2048/9535162A78ECD86B  created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04
                                card-no: 0006 01740323
ssb>  rsa2048/AF6608D736BA8F9B  created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04
                                card-no: 0006 01740323
jas@latte:~$ 

Using the key will not work though.

jas@latte:~$ echo foo|gpg -a --sign
gpg: no default secret key: No secret key
gpg: signing failed: No secret key
jas@latte:~$ 

This is because the public key and the secret key stub are not available.

jas@latte:~$ gpg --list-keys
jas@latte:~$ gpg --list-secret-keys
jas@latte:~$ 

You need to import the key for this to work. I have some vague memory that gpg --card-status was supposed to do this, but I may be wrong.

jas@latte:~$ gpg --recv-keys 9AA9BDB11BB1B99A21285A330664A76954265E8C
gpg: failed to start the dirmngr '/usr/bin/dirmngr': No such file or directory
gpg: connecting dirmngr at '/run/user/1000/gnupg/S.dirmngr' failed: No such file or directory
gpg: keyserver receive failed: No dirmngr
jas@latte:~$ 

Surprisingly, dirmngr is also not shipped by default so it has to be installed manually.

root@latte:~# apt-get install dirmngr

Below I proceed to trust the clouds to find my key.

jas@latte:~$ gpg --recv-keys 9AA9BDB11BB1B99A21285A330664A76954265E8C
gpg: key 0664A76954265E8C: public key "Simon Josefsson " imported
gpg: no ultimately trusted keys found
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:               imported: 1
jas@latte:~$ 

Now the public key and the secret key stub are available locally.

jas@latte:~$ gpg --list-keys
/home/jas/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
----------------------------
pub   rsa3744 2014-06-22 [SC] [expires: 2017-09-04]
      9AA9BDB11BB1B99A21285A330664A76954265E8C
uid           [ unknown] Simon Josefsson 
uid           [ unknown] Simon Josefsson 
sub   rsa2048 2014-06-22 [S] [expires: 2017-09-04]
sub   rsa2048 2014-06-22 [E] [expires: 2017-09-04]
sub   rsa2048 2014-06-22 [A] [expires: 2017-09-04]

jas@latte:~$ gpg --list-secret-keys
/home/jas/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
----------------------------
sec#  rsa3744 2014-06-22 [SC] [expires: 2017-09-04]
      9AA9BDB11BB1B99A21285A330664A76954265E8C
uid           [ unknown] Simon Josefsson 
uid           [ unknown] Simon Josefsson 
ssb>  rsa2048 2014-06-22 [S] [expires: 2017-09-04]
ssb>  rsa2048 2014-06-22 [E] [expires: 2017-09-04]
ssb>  rsa2048 2014-06-22 [A] [expires: 2017-09-04]

jas@latte:~$ 

I am now able to sign data with the smartcard, yay!

jas@latte:~$ echo foo|gpg -a --sign
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

owGbwMvMwMHYxl2/2+iH4FzG01xJDJFu3+XT8vO5OhmNWRgYORhkxRRZZjrGPJwQ
yxe68keDGkwxKxNIJQMXpwBMRJGd/a98NMPJQt6jaoyO9yUVlmS7s7qm+Kjwr53G
uq9wQ+z+/kOdk9w4Q39+SMvc+mEV72kuH9WaW9bVqj80jN77hUbfTn5mffu2/aVL
h/IneTfaOQaukHij/P8A0//Phg/maWbONUjjySrl+a3tP8ll6/oeCd8g/aeTlH79
i0naanjW4bjv9wnvGuN+LPHLmhUc2zvZdyK3xttN/roHvsdX3f53yTAxeInvXZmd
x7W0/hVPX33Y4nT877T/ak4L057IBSavaPVcf4yhglVI8XuGgaTP666Wuslbliy4
5W5eLasbd33Xd/W0hTINznuz0kJ4r1bLHZW9fvjLduMPq5rS2co9tvW8nX9rhZ/D
zycu/QA=
=I8rt
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
jas@latte:~$ 

Encrypting to myself will not work smoothly though.

jas@latte:~$ echo foo|gpg -a --encrypt -r simon@josefsson.org
gpg: 9535162A78ECD86B: There is no assurance this key belongs to the named user
sub  rsa2048/9535162A78ECD86B 2014-06-22 Simon Josefsson 
 Primary key fingerprint: 9AA9 BDB1 1BB1 B99A 2128  5A33 0664 A769 5426 5E8C
      Subkey fingerprint: DC9F 9B7D 8831 692A A852  D95B 9535 162A 78EC D86B

It is NOT certain that the key belongs to the person named
in the user ID.  If you *really* know what you are doing,
you may answer the next question with yes.

Use this key anyway? (y/N) 
gpg: signal Interrupt caught ... exiting

jas@latte:~$ 

The reason is that the newly imported key has unknown trust settings. I update the trust settings on my key to fix this, and encrypting now works without a prompt.

jas@latte:~$ gpg --edit-key 9AA9BDB11BB1B99A21285A330664A76954265E8C
gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.18; Copyright (C) 2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.

Secret key is available.

pub  rsa3744/0664A76954265E8C
     created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04  usage: SC  
     trust: unknown       validity: unknown
ssb  rsa2048/860B7FBB32F8119D
     created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04  usage: S   
     card-no: 0006 01740323
ssb  rsa2048/9535162A78ECD86B
     created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04  usage: E   
     card-no: 0006 01740323
ssb  rsa2048/AF6608D736BA8F9B
     created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04  usage: A   
     card-no: 0006 01740323
[ unknown] (1). Simon Josefsson 
[ unknown] (2)  Simon Josefsson 

gpg> trust
pub  rsa3744/0664A76954265E8C
     created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04  usage: SC  
     trust: unknown       validity: unknown
ssb  rsa2048/860B7FBB32F8119D
     created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04  usage: S   
     card-no: 0006 01740323
ssb  rsa2048/9535162A78ECD86B
     created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04  usage: E   
     card-no: 0006 01740323
ssb  rsa2048/AF6608D736BA8F9B
     created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04  usage: A   
     card-no: 0006 01740323
[ unknown] (1). Simon Josefsson 
[ unknown] (2)  Simon Josefsson 

Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)

  1 = I don't know or won't say
  2 = I do NOT trust
  3 = I trust marginally
  4 = I trust fully
  5 = I trust ultimately
  m = back to the main menu

Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y

pub  rsa3744/0664A76954265E8C
     created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04  usage: SC  
     trust: ultimate      validity: unknown
ssb  rsa2048/860B7FBB32F8119D
     created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04  usage: S   
     card-no: 0006 01740323
ssb  rsa2048/9535162A78ECD86B
     created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04  usage: E   
     card-no: 0006 01740323
ssb  rsa2048/AF6608D736BA8F9B
     created: 2014-06-22  expires: 2017-09-04  usage: A   
     card-no: 0006 01740323
[ unknown] (1). Simon Josefsson 
[ unknown] (2)  Simon Josefsson 
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.

gpg> quit
jas@latte:~$ echo foo|gpg -a --encrypt -r simon@josefsson.org
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

hQEMA5U1Fip47NhrAQgArTvAykj/YRhWVuXb6nzeEigtlvKFSmGHmbNkJgF5+r1/
/hWENR72wsb1L0ROaLIjM3iIwNmyBURMiG+xV8ZE03VNbJdORW+S0fO6Ck4FaIj8
iL2/CXyp1obq1xCeYjdPf2nrz/P2Evu69s1K2/0i9y2KOK+0+u9fEGdAge8Gup6y
PWFDFkNj2YiVa383BqJ+kV51tfquw+T4y5MfVWBoHlhm46GgwjIxXiI+uBa655IM
EgwrONcZTbAWSV4/ShhR9ug9AzGIJgpu9x8k2i+yKcBsgAh/+d8v7joUaPRZlGIr
kim217hpA3/VLIFxTTkkm/BO1KWBlblxvVaL3RZDDNI5AVp0SASswqBqT3W5ew+K
nKdQ6UTMhEFe8xddsLjkI9+AzHfiuDCDxnxNgI1haI6obp9eeouGXUKG
=s6kt
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
jas@latte:~$ 

So everything is fine, isn’t it? Alas, not quite.

jas@latte:~$ ssh-add -L
The agent has no identities.
jas@latte:~$ 

Tracking this down, I now realize that GNOME’s keyring is used for SSH but GnuPG’s gpg-agent is used for GnuPG. GnuPG uses the environment variable GPG_AGENT_INFO to connect to an agent, and SSH uses the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable to find its agent. The filenames used below leak the knowledge that gpg-agent is used for GnuPG but GNOME keyring is used for SSH.

jas@latte:~$ echo $GPG_AGENT_INFO 
/run/user/1000/gnupg/S.gpg-agent:0:1
jas@latte:~$ echo $SSH_AUTH_SOCK 
/run/user/1000/keyring/ssh
jas@latte:~$ 

Here the same recipe as in my previous blog post works. This time GNOME keyring only has to be disabled for SSH. Disabling GNOME keyring is not sufficient, you also need gpg-agent to start with enable-ssh-support. The simplest way to achieve that is to add a line in ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf as follows. When you login, the script /etc/X11/Xsession.d/90gpg-agent will set the environment variables GPG_AGENT_INFO and SSH_AUTH_SOCK. The latter variable is only set if enable-ssh-support is mentioned in the gpg-agent configuration.

jas@latte:~$ mkdir ~/.config/autostart
jas@latte:~$ cp /etc/xdg/autostart/gnome-keyring-ssh.desktop ~/.config/autostart/
jas@latte:~$ echo 'Hidden=true' >> ~/.config/autostart/gnome-keyring-ssh.desktop 
jas@latte:~$ echo enable-ssh-support >> ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf 
jas@latte:~$ 

Log out from GNOME and log in again. Now you should see ssh-add -L working.

jas@latte:~$ ssh-add -L
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDFP+UOTZJ+OXydpmbKmdGOVoJJz8se7lMs139T+TNLryk3EEWF+GqbB4VgzxzrGjwAMSjeQkAMb7Sbn+VpbJf1JDPFBHoYJQmg6CX4kFRaGZT6DHbYjgia59WkdkEYTtB7KPkbFWleo/RZT2u3f8eTedrP7dhSX0azN0lDuu/wBrwedzSV+AiPr10rQaCTp1V8sKbhz5ryOXHQW0Gcps6JraRzMW+ooKFX3lPq0pZa7qL9F6sE4sDFvtOdbRJoZS1b88aZrENGx8KSrcMzARq9UBn1plsEG4/3BRv/BgHHaF+d97by52R0VVyIXpLlkdp1Uk4D9cQptgaH4UAyI1vr cardno:000601740323
jas@latte:~$ 

Topics for further discussion or research include 1) whether scdaemon, dirmngr and/or pcscd should be pre-installed on Debian desktop systems; 2) whether gpg --card-status should attempt to import the public key and secret key stub automatically; 3) why GNOME keyring is used by default for SSH rather than gpg-agent; 4) whether GNOME keyring should support smartcards, or if it is better to always use gpg-agent for GnuPG/SSH, 5) if something could/should be done to automatically infer the trust setting for a secret key.

Enjoy!

Cosmos – A Simple Configuration Management System

Back in early 2012 I had been helping with system administration of a number of Debian/Ubuntu-based machines, and the odd Solaris machine, for a couple of years at $DAYJOB. We had a combination of hand-written scripts, documentation notes that we cut’n’paste’d from during installation, and some locally maintained Debian packages for pulling in dependencies and providing some configuration files. As the number of people and machines involved grew, I realized that I wasn’t happy with how these machines were being administrated. If one of these machines would disappear in flames, it would take time (and more importantly, non-trivial manual labor) to get its services up and running again. I wanted a system that could automate the complete configuration of any Unix-like machine. It should require minimal human interaction. I wanted the configuration files to be version controlled. I wanted good security properties. I did not want to rely on a centralized server that would be a single point of failure. It had to be portable and be easy to get to work on new (and very old) platforms. It should be easy to modify a configuration file and get it deployed. I wanted it to be easy to start to use on an existing server. I wanted it to allow for incremental adoption. Surely this must exist, I thought.

During January 2012 I evaluated the existing configuration management systems around, like CFEngine, Chef, and Puppet. I don’t recall my reasons for rejecting each individual project, but needless to say I did not find what I was looking for. The reasons for rejecting the projects I looked at ranged from centralization concerns (single-point-of-failure central servers), bad security (no OpenPGP signing integration), to the feeling that the projects were too complex and hence fragile. I’m sure there were other reasons too.

In February I started going back to my original needs and tried to see if I could abstract something from the knowledge that was in all these notes, script snippets and local dpkg packages. I realized that the essence of what I wanted was one shell script per machine, OpenPGP signed, in a Git repository. I could check out that Git repository on every new machine that I wanted to configure, verify the OpenPGP signature of the shell script, and invoke the script. The script would do everything needed to get the machine up into an operational stage again, including package installation and configuration file changes. Since I would usually want to modify configuration files on a system even after its initial installation (hey not everyone is perfect), it was natural to extend this idea to a cron job that did ‘git pull’, verified the OpenPGP signature, and ran the script. The script would then have to be a bit more clever and not redo everything every time.

Since we had many machines, it was obvious that there would be huge code duplication between scripts. It felt natural to think of splitting up the shell script into a directory with many smaller shell scripts, and invoke each shell script in turn. Think of the /etc/init.d/ hierarchy and how it worked with System V initd. This would allow re-use of useful snippets across several machines. The next realization was that large parts of the shell script would be to create configuration files, such as /etc/network/interfaces. It would be easier to modify the content of those files if they were stored as files in a separate directory, an “overlay” stored in a sub-directory overlay/, and copied into the file system’s hierarchy with rsync. The final realization was that it made some sense to run one set of scripts before rsync’ing in the configuration files (to be able to install packages or set things up for the configuration files to make sense), and one set of scripts after the rsync (to perform tasks that require some package to be installed and configured). These set of scripts were called the “pre-tasks” and “post-tasks” respectively, and stored in sub-directories called pre-tasks.d/ and post-tasks.d/.

I started putting what would become Cosmos together during February 2012. Incidentally, I had been using etckeeper on our machines, and I had been reading its source code, and it greatly inspired the internal design of Cosmos. The git history shows well how the ideas evolved — even that Cosmos was initially called Eve but in retrospect I didn’t like the religious connotations — and there were a couple of rewrites on the way, but on the 28th of February I pushed out version 1.0. It was in total 778 lines of code, with at least 200 of those lines being the license boiler plate at the top of each file. Version 1.0 had a debian/ directory and I built the dpkg file and started to deploy on it some machines. There were a couple of small fixes in the next few days, but development stopped on March 5th 2012. We started to use Cosmos, and converted more and more machines to it, and I quickly also converted all of my home servers to use it. And even my laptops. It took until September 2014 to discover the first bug (the fix is a one-liner). Since then there haven’t been any real changes to the source code. It is in daily use today.

The README that comes with Cosmos gives a more hands-on approach on using it, which I hope will serve as a starting point if the above introduction sparked some interest. I hope to cover more about how to use Cosmos in a later blog post. Since Cosmos does so little on its own, to make sense of how to use it, you want to see a Git repository with machine models. If you want to see how the Git repository for my own machines looks you can see the sjd-cosmos repository. Don’t miss its README at the bottom. In particular, its global/ sub-directory contains some of the foundation, such as OpenPGP key trust handling.

OpenPGP Smartcards and GNOME

The combination of GnuPG and a OpenPGP smartcard has been implemented and working for almost a decade. I recall starting to use it when I received a FSFE Fellowship card in 2006. Today I’m using a YubiKey NEO. Sadly there has been some regressions when using them under GNOME recently. I reinstalled my laptop with Debian Jessie (beta2) recently, and now took the time to work through the issue and write down a workaround.

To work with GnuPG and smartcards you install GnuPG agent, scdaemon, pscsd and pcsc-tools. On Debian you can do it like this:

apt-get install gnupg-agent scdaemon pcscd pcsc-tools

Use the pcsc_scan command line tool to make sure pcscd recognize the smartcard before continuing, if that doesn’t recognize the smartcard nothing beyond this point will work. The next step is to make sure you have the following line in ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf:

use-agent

Logging out and into GNOME should start gpg-agent for you, through the /etc/X11/Xsession.d/90gpg-agent script. In theory, this should be all that is required. However, when you start a terminal and attempt to use the smartcard through GnuPG you would get an error like this:

jas@latte:~$ gpg --card-status
gpg: selecting openpgp failed: unknown command
gpg: OpenPGP card not available: general error
jas@latte:~$

The reason is that the GNOME Keyring hijacks the GnuPG agent’s environment variables and effectively replaces gpg-agent with gnome-keyring-daemon which does not support smartcard commands (Debian bug #773304). GnuPG uses the environment variable GPG_AGENT_INFO to find the location of the agent socket, and when the GNOME Keyring is active it will typically look like this:

jas@latte:~$ echo $GPG_AGENT_INFO 
/run/user/1000/keyring/gpg:0:1
jas@latte:~$ 

If you use GnuPG with a smartcard, I recommend to disable GNOME Keyring’s GnuPG and SSH agent emulation code. This used to be easy to achieve in older GNOME releases (e.g., the one included in Debian Wheezy), through the gnome-session-properties GUI. Sadly there is no longer any GUI for disabling this functionality (Debian bug #760102). The GNOME Keyring GnuPG/SSH agent replacement functionality is invoked through the XDG autostart mechanism, and the documented way to disable system-wide services for a normal user account is to invoke the following commands.

jas@latte:~$ mkdir ~/.config/autostart
jas@latte:~$ cp /etc/xdg/autostart/gnome-keyring-gpg.desktop ~/.config/autostart/
jas@latte:~$ echo 'Hidden=true' >> ~/.config/autostart/gnome-keyring-gpg.desktop 
jas@latte:~$ cp /etc/xdg/autostart/gnome-keyring-ssh.desktop ~/.config/autostart/
jas@latte:~$ echo 'Hidden=true' >> ~/.config/autostart/gnome-keyring-ssh.desktop 
jas@latte:~$ 

You now need to logout and login again. When you start a terminal, you can look at the GPG_AGENT_INFO environment variable again and everything should be working again.

jas@latte:~$ echo $GPG_AGENT_INFO 
/tmp/gpg-dqR4L7/S.gpg-agent:1890:1
jas@latte:~$ echo $SSH_AUTH_SOCK 
/tmp/gpg-54VfLs/S.gpg-agent.ssh
jas@latte:~$ gpg --card-status
Application ID ...: D2760001240102000060000000420000
...
jas@latte:~$ ssh-add -L
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDFP+UOTZJ+OXydpmbKmdGOVoJJz8se7lMs139T+TNLryk3EEWF+GqbB4VgzxzrGjwAMSjeQkAMb7Sbn+VpbJf1JDPFBHoYJQmg6CX4kFRaGZT6DHbYjgia59WkdkEYTtB7KPkbFWleo/RZT2u3f8eTedrP7dhSX0azN0lDuu/wBrwedzSV+AiPr10rQaCTp1V8sKbhz5ryOXHQW0Gcps6JraRzMW+ooKFX3lPq0pZa7qL9F6sE4sDFvtOdbRJoZS1b88aZrENGx8KSrcMzARq9UBn1plsEG4/3BRv/BgHHaF+d97by52R0VVyIXpLlkdp1Uk4D9cQptgaH4UAyI1vr cardno:006000000042
jas@latte:~$ 

That’s it. Resolving this properly involves 1) adding smartcard code to the GNOME Keyring, 2) disabling the GnuPG/SSH replacement code in GNOME Keyring completely, 3) reorder the startup so that gpg-agent supersedes gnome-keyring-daemon instead of vice versa, so that people who installed the gpg-agent really gets it instead of the GNOME default, or 4) something else. I don’t have a strong opinion on how to solve this, but 3) sounds like a simple way forward.

The Case for Short OpenPGP Key Validity Periods

After I moved to a new OpenPGP key (see key transition statement) I have received comments about the short life length of my new key. When I created the key (see my GnuPG setup) I set it to expire after 100 days. Some people assumed that I would have to create a new key then, and therefore wondered what value there is to sign a key that will expire in two months. It doesn’t work like that, and below I will explain how OpenPGP key expiration works; how to extend the expiration time of your key; and argue why having a relatively short validity period can be a good thing.
Continue reading The Case for Short OpenPGP Key Validity Periods

Offline GnuPG Master Key and Subkeys on YubiKey NEO Smartcard

I have moved to a new OpenPGP key. There are many tutorials and blog posts on GnuPG key generation around, but none of them matched exactly the setup I wanted to have. So I wrote down the steps I took, to remember them if I need to in the future. Briefly my requirements were as follows:

  • The new master GnuPG key is on an USB stick.
  • The USB stick is only ever used on an offline computer.
  • There are subkeys stored on a YubiKey NEO smartcard for daily use.
  • I want to generate the subkeys using GnuPG so I have a backup.
  • Some non-default hash/cipher preferences encoded into the public key.

Continue reading Offline GnuPG Master Key and Subkeys on YubiKey NEO Smartcard

OpenPGP Key Transition Statement

I have created a new OpenPGP key 54265e8c and will be transitioning away from my old key. If you have signed my old key, I would appreciate signatures on my new key as well. I have created a transition statement that can be downloaded from https://josefsson.org/key-transition-2014-06-22.txt.

Below is the signed statement.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

OpenPGP Key Transition Statement for Simon Josefsson

I have created a new OpenPGP key and will be transitioning away from
my old key.  The old key has not been compromised and will continue to
be valid for some time, but I prefer all future correspondence to be
encrypted to the new key, and will be making signatures with the new
key going forward.

I would like this new key to be re-integrated into the web of trust.
This message is signed by both keys to certify the transition.  My new
and old keys are signed by each other.  If you have signed my old key,
I would appreciate signatures on my new key as well, provided that
your signing policy permits that without re-authenticating me.

The old key, which I am transitioning away from, is:

pub   1280R/B565716F 2002-05-05
      Key fingerprint = 0424 D4EE 81A0 E3D1 19C6  F835 EDA2 1E94 B565 716F

The new key, to which I am transitioning, is:

pub   3744R/54265E8C 2014-06-22
      Key fingerprint = 9AA9 BDB1 1BB1 B99A 2128  5A33 0664 A769 5426 5E8C

The entire key may be downloaded from: https://josefsson.org/54265e8c.txt

To fetch the full new key from a public key server using GnuPG, run:

  gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 54265e8c

If you already know my old key, you can now verify that the new key is
signed by the old one:

  gpg --check-sigs 54265e8c

If you are satisfied that you've got the right key, and the User IDs
match what you expect, I would appreciate it if you would sign my key:

  gpg --sign-key 54265e8c

You can upload your signatures to a public keyserver directly:

  gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --send-key 54265e8c

Or email simon@josefsson.org (possibly encrypted) the output from:

  gpg --armor --export 54265e8c

If you'd like any further verification or have any questions about the
transition please contact me directly.

To verify the integrity of this statement:

  wget -q -O- https://josefsson.org/key-transition-2014-06-22.txt|gpg --verify

/Simon
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