Since the release of Trisquel 11 I have been busy migrating x86 machines from Debian to Trisquel. One would think that I would be finished after this time period, but re-installing and migrating machines is really time consuming, especially if you allow yourself to be distracted every time you notice something that Really Ought to be improved. Rabbit holes all the way down. One of my production machines is running Debian 11 “bullseye” on a Talos II Lite machine from Raptor Computing Systems, and migrating the virtual machines running on that host (including the VM that serves this blog) to a x86 machine running Trisquel felt unsatisfying to me. I want to migrate my computing towards hardware that harmonize with FSF’s Respects Your Freedom and not away from it. Here I had to chose between using the non-free software present in newer Debian or the non-free software implied by most x86 systems: not an easy chose. So I have ignored the dilemma for some time. After all, the machine was running Debian 11 “bullseye”, which was released before Debian started to require use of non-free software. With the end-of-life date for bullseye approaching, it seems that this isn’t a sustainable choice.
There is a report open about providing ppc64el ISOs that was created by Jason Self shortly after the release, but for many months nothing happened. About a month ago, Luis Guzmán mentioned an initial ISO build and I started testing it. The setup has worked well for a month, and with this post I want to contribute instructions how to get it up and running since this is still missing.
The setup of my soon-to-be new production machine:
Talos II Lite
POWER9 18-core v2 CPU
Inter-Tech 4U-4410 rack case with ASPOWER power supply
8x32GB DDR4-2666 ECC RDIMM
HighPoint SSD7505 (the Rocket 1504 or 1204 would be a more cost-effective choice, but I re-used a component I had laying around)
PERC H700 aka LSI MegaRAID 2108 SAS/SATA (also found laying around)
Sadly, no hash checksums or OpenPGP signatures are published.
Power off your device, insert the USB stick, and power it up, and you see a Petitboot menu offering to boot from the USB stick. For some reason, the "Expert Install" was the default in the menu, and instead I select "Default Install" for the regular experience. For this post, I will ignore BMC/IPMI, as interacting with it is not necessary. Make sure to not connect the BMC/IPMI ethernet port unless you are willing to enter that dungeon. The VGA console works fine with a normal USB keyboard, and you can chose to use only the second enP4p1s0f1 network card in the network card selection menu.
If you are familiar with Debian netinst ISO’s, the installation is straight-forward. I complicate the setup by partitioning two RAID1 partitions on the two NVMe sticks, one RAID1 for a 75GB ext4 root filesystem (discard,noatime) and one RAID1 for a 900GB LVM volume group for virtual machines, and two 20GB swap partitions on each of the NVMe sticks (to silence a warning about lack of swap, I’m not sure swap is still a good idea?). The 3x18TB disks use DM-integrity with RAID1 however the installer does not support DM-integrity so I had to create it after the installation.
There are two additional matters worth mentioning:
Selecting the apt mirror does not have the list of well-known Trisquel mirrors which the x86 installer offers. Instead I have to input the archive mirror manually, and fortunately the archive.trisquel.org hostname and path values are available as defaults, so I just press enter and fix this after the installation has finished. You may want to have the hostname/path of your local mirror handy, to speed things up.
The installer asks me which kernel to use, which the x86 installer does not do. I believe older Trisquel/Ubuntu installers asked this question, but that it was gone in aramo on x86. I select the default “linux-image-generic” which gives me a predictable 5.15 Linux-libre kernel, although you may want to chose “linux-image-generic-hwe-11.0” for a more recent 6.2 Linux-libre kernel. Maybe this is intentional debinst-behaviour for non-x86 platforms?
I have re-installed the machine a couple of times, and have now finished installing the production setup. I haven’t ran into any serious issues, and the system has been stable. Time to wrap up, and celebrate that I now run an operating system aligned with the Free System Distribution Guidelines on hardware that aligns with Respects Your Freedom — Happy Hacking indeed!
For Debian package maintainers, the wrap-and-sort tool is one of those nice tools that I use once in a while, and every time have to re-read the documentation to conclude that I want to use the --wrap-always --short-indent --trailing-comma --sort-binary-package options (or -satb for short). Every time, I also wish that I could automate this and have it always be invoked to keep my debian/ directory tidy, so I don’t have to do this manually once every blue moon. I haven’t found a way to achieve this automation in a non-obtrusive way that interacts well with my git-based packaging workflow. Ideally I would like for something like the lintian-hook during gbp buildpackage to check for this – ideas?
Meanwhile, I have come up with a way to make sure I don’t forget to run wrap-and-sort for long, and that others who work on the same package won’t either: create an autopkgtest which is invoked during the Salsa CI/CD pipeline using the following as debian/tests/wrap-and-sort:
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
TMPDIR=$(mktemp -d)
trap "rm -rf $TMPDIR" 0 INT QUIT ABRT PIPE TERM
cp -a debian $TMPDIR
cd $TMPDIR
wrap-and-sort -satb
diff -ur $OLDPWD/debian debian
Add the following to debian/tests/control to invoke it – which is intentionally not indented properly so that the self-test will fail so you will learn how it behaves.
Now I will get build failures in the pipeline once I upload the package into Salsa, which I usually do before uploading into Debian. I will get a diff output, and it won’t be happy until I push a commit with the output of running wrap-and-sort with the parameters I settled with.
While autopkgtest is intended to test the installed package, the tooling around autopkgtest is powerful and easily allows this mild abuse of its purpose for a pleasant QA improvement.
A personal reflection on how I moved from my Debian home to find two new homes with Trisquel and Guix for my own ethical computing, and while doing so settled my dilemma about further Debian contributions.
Debian‘s contributions to the free software community has been tremendous. Debian was one of the early distributions in the 1990’s that combined the GNU tools (compiler, linker, shell, editor, and a set of Unix tools) with the Linux kernel and published a free software operating system. Back then there were little guidance on how to publish free software binaries, let alone entire operating systems. There was a lack of established community processes and conflict resolution mechanisms, and lack of guiding principles to motivate the work. The community building efforts that came about in parallel with the technical work has resulted in a steady flow of releases over the years.
One of my earlier Slackware install disk sets, kept for nostalgic reasons.
I was introduced to GNU/Linux through Slackware in the early 1990’s (oh boy those nights calculating XFree86 modeline’s and debugging sendmail.cf) and primarily used RedHat Linux during ca 1995-2003. I switched to Debian during the Woody release cycles, when the original RedHat Linux was abandoned and Fedora launched. It was Debian’s explicit community processes and infrastructure that attracted me. The slow nature of community processes also kept me using RedHat for so long: centralized and dogmatic decision processes often produce quick and effective outcomes, and in my opinion RedHat Linux was technically better than Debian ca 1995-2003. However the RedHat model was not sustainable, and resulted in the RedHat vs Fedora split. Debian catched up, and reached technical stability once its community processes had been grounded. I started participating in the Debian community around late 2006.
My interpretation of Debian’s social contract is that Debian should be a distribution of works licensed 100% under a free license. The Debian community has always been inclusive towards non-free software, creating the contrib/non-free section and permitting use of the bug tracker to help resolve issues with non-free works. This is all explained in the social contract. There has always been a clear boundary between free and non-free work, and there has been a commitment that the Debian system itself would be 100% free.
The concern that RedHat Linux was not 100% free software was not critical to me at the time: I primarily (and happily) ran GNU tools on Solaris, IRIX, AIX, OS/2, Windows etc. Running GNU tools on RedHat Linux was an improvement, and I hadn’t realized it was possible to get rid of all non-free software on my own primary machine. Debian realized that goal for me. I’ve been a believer in that model ever since. I can use Solaris, macOS, Android etc knowing that I have the option of using a 100% free Debian.
While the inclusive approach towards non-free software invite and deserve criticism (some argue that being inclusive to non-inclusive behavior is a bad idea), I believe that Debian’s approach was a successful survival technique: by being inclusive to – and a compromise between – free and non-free communities, Debian has been able to stay relevant and contribute to both environments. If Debian had not served and contributed to the free community, I believe free software people would have stopped contributing. If Debian had rejected non-free works completely, I don’t think the successful Ubuntu distribution would have been based on Debian.
I wrote the majority of the text above back in September 2022, intending to post it as a way to argue for my proposal to maintain the status quo within Debian. I didn’t post it because I felt I was saying the obvious, and that the obvious do not need to be repeated, and the rest of the post was just me going down memory lane.
The Debian project has been a sustainable producer of a 100% free OS up until Debian 11 bullseye. In the resolution on non-free firmware the community decided to leave the model that had resulted in a 100% free Debian for so long. The goal of Debian is no longer to publish a 100% free operating system, instead this was added: “The Debian official media may include firmware”. Indeed the Debian 12 bookworm release has confirmed that this would not only be an optional possibility. The Debian community could have published a 100% free Debian, in parallel with the non-free Debian, and still be consistent with their newly adopted policy, but chose not to. The result is that Debian’s policies are not consistent with their actions. It doesn’t make sense to claim that Debian is 100% free when the Debian installer contains non-free software. Actions speaks louder than words, so I’m left reading the policies as well-intended prose that is no longer used for guidance, but for the peace of mind for people living in ivory towers. And to attract funding, I suppose.
So how to deal with this, on a personal level? I did not have an answer to that back in October 2022 after the vote. It wasn’t clear to me that I would ever want to contribute to Debian under the new social contract that promoted non-free software. I went on vacation from any Debian work. Meanwhile Debian 12 bookworm was released, confirming my fears. I kept coming back to this text, and my only take-away was that it would be unethical for me to use Debian on my machines. Letting actions speak for themselves, I switched to PureOS on my main laptop during October, barely noticing any difference since it is based on Debian 11 bullseye. Back in December, I bought a new laptop and tried Trisquel and Guix on it, as they promise a migration path towards ppc64el that PureOS do not.
While I pondered how to approach my modest Debian contributions, I set out to learn Trisquel and gained trust in it. I migrated one Debian machine after another to Trisquel, and started to use Guix on others. Migration was easy because Trisquel is based on Ubuntu which is based on Debian. Using Guix has its challenges, but I enjoy its coherant documented environment. All of my essential self-hosted servers (VM hosts, DNS, e-mail, WWW, Nextcloud, CI/CD builders, backup etc) uses Trisquel or Guix now. I’ve migrated many GitLab CI/CD rules to use Trisquel instead of Debian, to have a more ethical computing base for software development and deployment. I wish there were official Guix docker images around.
Time has passed, and when I now think about any Debian contributions, I’m a little less muddled by my disappointment of the exclusion of a 100% free Debian. I realize that today I can use Debian in the same way that I use macOS, Android, RHEL or Ubuntu. And what prevents me from contributing to free software on those platforms? So I will make the occasional Debian contribution again, knowing that it will also indirectly improve Trisquel. To avoid having to install Debian, I need a development environment in Trisquel that allows me to build Debian packages. I have found a recipe for doing this:
# System commands: sudo apt-get install debhelper git-buildpackage debian-archive-keyring sudo wget -O /usr/share/debootstrap/scripts/debian-common https://sources.debian.org/data/main/d/debootstrap/1.0.128%2Bnmu2/scripts/debian-common sudo wget -O /usr/share/debootstrap/scripts/sid https://sources.debian.org/data/main/d/debootstrap/1.0.128%2Bnmu2/scripts/sid # Run once to create build image: DIST=sid git-pbuilder create --mirror http://deb.debian.org/debian/ --debootstrapopts "--exclude=usr-is-merged" --basepath /var/cache/pbuilder/base-sid.cow # Run in a directory with debian/ to build a package: gbp buildpackage --git-pbuilder --git-dist=sid
How to sustainably deliver a 100% free software binary distributions seems like an open question, and the challenges are not all that different compared to the 1990’s or early 2000’s. I’m hoping Debian will come back to provide a 100% free platform, but my fear is that Debian will compromise even further on the free software ideals rather than the opposite. With similar arguments that were used to add the non-free firmware, Debian could compromise the free software spirit of the Linux boot process (e.g., non-free boot images signed by Debian) and media handling (e.g., web browsers and DRM), as Debian have already done with appstore-like functionality for non-free software (Python pip). To learn about other freedom issues in Debian packaging, browsing Trisquel’s helper scripts may enlight you.
Debian’s setback and the recent setback for RHEL-derived distributions are sad, and it will be a challenge for these communities to find internally consistent coherency going forward. I wish them the best of luck, as Debian and RHEL are important for the wider free software eco-system. Let’s see how the community around Trisquel, Guix and the other FSDG-distributions evolve in the future.
The situation for free software today appears better than it was years ago regardless of Debian and RHEL’s setbacks though, which is important to remember! I don’t recall being able install a 100% free OS on a modern laptop and modern server as easily as I am able to do today.
Happy Hacking!
Addendum 22 July 2023: The original title of this post was Coping with non-free Debian, and there was a thread about it that included feedback on the title. I do agree that my initial title was confrontational, and I’ve changed it to the more specific Coping with non-free software in Debian. I do appreciate all the fine free software that goes into Debian, and hope that this will continue and improve, although I have doubts given the opinions expressed by the majority of developers. For the philosophically inclined, it is interesting to think about what it means to say that a compilation of software is freely licensed. At what point does a compilation of software deserve the labels free vs non-free? Windows probably contains some software that is published as free software, let’s say Windows is 1% free. Apple authors a lot of free software (as a tangent, Apple probably produce more free software than what Debian as an organization produces), and let’s say macOS contains 20% free software. Solaris (or some still maintained derivative like OpenIndiana) is mostly freely licensed these days, isn’t it? Let’s say it is 80% free. Ubuntu and RHEL pushes that closer to let’s say 95% free software. Debian used to be 100% but is now slightly less at maybe 99%. Trisquel and Guix are at 100%. At what point is it reasonable to call a compilation free? Does Debian deserve to be called freely licensed? Does macOS? Is it even possible to use these labels for compilations in any meaningful way? All numbers just taken from thin air. It isn’t even clear how this can be measured (binary bytes? lines of code? CPU cycles? etc). The caveat about license review mistakes applies. I ignore Debian’s own claims that Debian is 100% free software, which I believe is inconsistent and no longer true under any reasonable objective analysis. It was not true before the firmware vote since Debian ships with non-free blobs in the Linux kernel for example.
This is the kind of work that gets done while waiting for the build machines to attempt to reproducibly build PureOS. Unfortunately, the results is that a meager 16% of the 765 added/modifed packages are reproducible by me. There is some infrastructure work to be done to improve things: we should use sbuild for example. The build infrastructure should produce signed statements for each package it builds: One statement saying that it attempted to reproducible build a particular binary package (thus generated some build logs and diffoscope-output for auditing), and one statements saying that it actually was able to reproduce a package. Verifying such claims during apt-get install or possibly dpkg -i is a logical next step.
There is some code cleanups and release work to be done now. Which distribution will be the first apt-based distribution that includes native support for Sigstore? Let’s see.
Sigstore is not the only relevant transparency log around, and I’ve been trying to learn a bit about Sigsum to be able to support it as well. The more improved confidence about system security, the merrier!
Reflecting on this work made me realize that while the natural thing to do here was to differentiate two different apt-based distributions, I have realized the same way I did for debdistdiff that it would also be interesting to compare, say, Debian bookworm from Debian unstable, especially now that they should be fairly close together. My tooling should support that too. However, to really provide any benefit from the more complete existing reproducible testing of Debian, some further benefit from doing that would be useful and I can’t articulate one right now.
One ultimate goal with my effort is to improve trust in apt-repositories, and combining transparency-style protection a’la apt-sigstore with third-party validated reproducible builds may indeed be one such use-case that would benefit the wider community of apt-repositories. Imagine having your system not install any package unless it can verify it against a third-party reproducible build organization that commits their results in a tamper-proof transparency ledger. But I’m now on repeat here, so will stop.
Do you want your apt-get update to only ever use files whose hash checksum have been recorded in the globally immutable tamper-resistance ledger rekor provided by the Sigstore project? Well I thought you’d never ask, but now you can, thanks to my new projects apt-verify and apt-sigstore. I have not done proper stable releases yet, so this is work in progress. To try it out, adapt to the modern era of running random stuff from the Internet as root, and run the following commands. Use a container or virtual machine if you have trust issues.
If the stars are aligned (and the puppet projects’ of debdistget and debdistcanary have ran their GitLab CI/CD pipeline recently enough) you will see a successful output from apt-get update and your syslog will contain debug logs showing the entries from the rekor log for the release index files that you downloaded. See sample outputs in the README.
If you get tired of it, disabling is easy:
chmod -x /etc/apt/verify.d/apt-rekor
Our project currently supports Trisquel GNU/Linux 10 (nabia) & 11 (aramo), PureOS 10 (byzantium), Gnuinos chimaera, Ubuntu 20.04 (focal) & 22.04 (jammy), Debian 10 (buster) & 11 (bullseye), and Devuan GNU+Linux 4.0 (chimaera). Others can be supported to, please open an issue about it, although my focus is on FSDG-compliant distributions and their upstreams.
This is a continuation of my previous work on apt-canary. I have realized that it was better to separate out the generic part of apt-canary into my new project apt-verify that offers a plugin-based method, and then rewrote apt-canary to be one such plugin. Then apt-sigstore‘s apt-rekor was my second plugin for apt-verify.
Due to the design of things, and some current limitations, Ubuntu is the least stable since they push out new signed InRelease files frequently (mostly due to their use of Phased-Update-Percentage) and debdistget and debdistcanary CI/CD runs have a hard time keeping up. If you have insight on how to improve this, please comment me in the issue tracking the race condition.
There are limitations of what additional safety a rekor-based solution actually provides, but I expect that to improve as I get a cosign-based approach up and running. Currently apt-rekor mostly make targeted attacks less deniable. With a cosign-based approach, we could design things such that your machine only downloads updates when they have been publicly archived in an immutable fashion, or submitted for validation by a third-party such as my reproducible build setup for Trisquel GNU/Linux aramo.
The absolute number may not be impressive, but what I hope is at least a useful contribution is that there actually is a number on how much of Trisquel is reproducible. Hopefully this will inspire others to help improve the actual metric.
When I set about to understand how Trisquel worked, I identified a number of things that would improve my confidence in it. The lowest hanging fruit for me was to manually audit the package archive, and I wrote a tool called debdistdiff to automate this for me. That led me to think about apt archive transparency more in general. I have made some further work in that area (hint: apt-verify) that deserve its own blog post eventually. Most of apt archive transparency is futile if we don’t trust the intended packages that are in the archive. One way to measurable increase trust in the package are to provide reproducible builds of the packages, which should by now be an established best practice. Code review is still important, but since it will never provide positive guarantees we need other processes that can identify sub-optimal situations automatically. The way reproducible builds easily identify negative results is what I believe has driven much of its success: its results are tangible and measurable. The field of software engineering is in need of more such practices.
The design of my setup to build Trisquel reproducible are as follows.
The project debdistget is responsible for downloading Release/Packages files (which are the most relevant files from dists/) from apt archives, and works by commiting them into GitLab-hosted git-repositories. I maintain several such repositories for popular apt-archives, including for Trisquel and its upstream Ubuntu. GitLab invokes a schedule pipeline to do the downloading, and there is some race conditions here.
The project debdistdiff is used to produce the list of added and modified packages, which are the input to actually being able to know what packages to reproduce. It publishes human readable summary of difference for several distributions, including Trisquel vs Ubuntu. Early on I decided that rebuilding all of the upstream Ubuntu packages is out of scope for me: my personal trust in the official Debian/Ubuntu apt archives are greater than my trust of the added/modified packages in Trisquel.
The final project reproduce-trisquel puts the pieces together briefly as follows, everything being driven from its .gitlab-ci.yml file.
There is a (manually triggered) job generate-build-image to create a build image to speed up CI/CD runs, using a simple Dockerfile.
There is a (manually triggered) job generate-package-lists that uses debdistdiff to generate and store package lists and puts its output in lists/. The reason this is manually triggered right now is due to a race condition.
There is a (scheduled) job that does two things: from the package lists, the script generate-ci-packages.sh builds a GitLab CI/CD instruction file ci-packages.yml that describes jobs for each package to build. The second part is generate-readme.sh that re-generate the project’s README.md based on the build logs and diffoscope outputs that stored in the git repository.
Through the ci-packages.yml file, there is a large number of jobs that are dynamically defined, which currently are manually triggered to not overload the build servers. The script build-package.sh is invoked and attempts to rebuild a package, and stores build log and diffoscope output in the git project itself.
I did not expect to be able to use the GitLab shared runners to do the building, however they turned out to work quite well and I postponed setting up my own runner. There is a manually curated lists/disabled-aramo.txt with some packages that all required too much disk space or took over two hours to build. Today I finally took the time to setup a GitLab runner using podman running Trisquel aramo, and I expect to complete builds of the remaining packages soon — one of my Dell R630 server with 256GB RAM and dual 2680v4 CPUs should deliver sufficient performance.
Current limitations and ideas on further work (most are filed as project issues) include:
We don’t support *.buildinfo files. As far as I am aware, Trisquel does not publish them for their builds. Improving this would be a first step forward, anyone able to help? Compare buildinfo.debian.net. For example, many packages differ only in their NT_GNU_BUILD_ID symbol inside the ELF binary, see example diffoscope output for libgpg-error. By poking around in jenkins.trisquel.org I managed to discover that Trisquel built initramfs-utils in the randomized path /build/initramfs-tools-bzRLUp and hard-coding that path allowed me to reproduce that package. I expect the same to hold for many other packages. Unfortunately, this failure turned into success with that package moved the needle from 42% reproducibility to 43% however I didn’t let that stand in the way of a good headline.
The mechanism to download the Release/Package-files from dists/ is not fool-proof: we may not capture all ever published such files. While this is less of a concern for reproducibility, it is more of a concern for apt transparency. Still, having Trisquel provide a service similar to snapshot.debian.org would help.
Having at least one other CPU architecture would be nice.
Due to lack of time and mental focus, handling incremental updates of new versions of packages is not yet working. This means we only ever build one version of a package, and never discover any newly published versions of the same package. Now that Trisquel aramo is released, the expected rate of new versions should be low, but still happens due to security or backports.
Porting this to test supposedly FSDG-compliant distributions such as PureOS and Gnuinos should be relatively easy. I’m also looking at Devuan because of Gnuinos.
The elephant in the room is how reproducible Ubuntu is in the first place.
Happy Easter Hacking!
Update 2023-04-17: The original project “reproduce-trisquel” that was announced here has been archived and replaced with two projects, one generic “debdistreproduce” and one with results for Trisquel: “reproduce/trisquel“.
I’ve always found the operation of apt software package repositories to be a mystery. There appears to be a lack of transparency into which people have access to important apt package repositories out there, how the automatic non-human update mechanism is implemented, and what changes are published. I’m thinking of big distributions like Ubuntu and Debian, but also the free GNU/Linux distributions like Trisquel and PureOS that are derived from the more well-known distributions.
As far as I can tell, anyone who has the OpenPGP private key trusted by a apt-based GNU/Linux distribution can sign a modified Release/InRelease file and if my machine somehow downloads that version of the release file, my machine could be made to download and install packages that the distribution didn’t intend me to install. Further, it seems that anyone who has access to the main HTTP server, or any of its mirrors, or is anywhere on the network between them and my machine (when plaintext HTTP is used), can either stall security updates on my machine (on a per-IP basis), or use it to send my machine (again, on a per-IP basis to avoid detection) a modified Release/InRelease file if they had been able to obtain the private signing key for the archive. These are mighty powers that warrant overview.
I’ve always put off learning about the processes to protect the apt infrastructure, mentally filing it under “so many people rely on this infrastructure that enough people are likely to have invested time reviewing and improving these processes”. Simultaneous, I’ve always followed the more free-software friendly Debian-derived distributions such as gNewSense and have run it on some machines. I’ve never put them into serious production use, because the trust issues with their apt package repositories has been a big question mark for me. The “enough people” part of my rationale for deferring this is not convincing. Even the simple question of “is someone updating the apt repository” is not easy to understand on a running gNewSense system. At some point in time the gNewSense cron job to pull in security updates from Debian must have stopped working, and I wouldn’t have had any good mechanism to notice that. Most likely it happened without any public announcement. I’ve recently switched to Trisquel on production machines, and these questions has come back to haunt me.
The situation is unsatisfying and I looked into what could be done to improve it. I could try to understand who are the key people involved in each project, and may even learn what hardware component is used, or what software is involved to update and sign apt repositories. Is the server running non-free software? Proprietary BIOS or NIC firmware? Are the GnuPG private keys on disk? Smartcard? TPM? YubiKey? HSM? Where is the server co-located, and who has access to it? I tried to do a bit of this, and discovered things like Trisquel having a DSA1024 key in its default apt trust store (although for fairness, it seems that apt by default does not trust such signatures). However, I’m not certain understanding this more would scale to securing my machines against attacks on this infrastructure. Even people with the best intentions, and the state of the art hardware and software, will have problems.
To increase my trust in Trisquel I set out to understand how it worked. To make it easier to sort out what the interesting parts of the Trisquel archive to audit further were, I created debdistdiff to produce human readable text output comparing one apt archive with another apt archive. There is a GitLab CI/CD cron job that runs this every day, producing output comparing Trisquel vs Ubuntu and PureOS vs Debian. Working with these output files has made me learn more about how the process works, and I even stumbled upon something that is likely a bug where Trisquel aramo was imported from Ubuntu jammy while it contained a couple of package (e.g., gcc-8, python3.9) that were removed for the final Ubuntu jammy release.
After working on auditing the Trisquel archive manually that way, I realized that whatever I could tell from comparing Trisquel with Ubuntu, it would only be something based on a current snapshot of the archives. Tomorrow it may look completely different. What felt necessary was to audit the differences of the Trisquel archive continously. I was quite happy to have developed debdistdiff for one purpose (comparing two different archives like Trisquel and Ubuntu) and discovered that the tool could be used for another purpose (comparing the Trisquel archive at two different points in time). At this time I realized that I needed a log of all different apt archive metadata to be able to produce an audit log of the differences in time for the archive. I create manually curated git-repositories with the Release/InRelease and the Packages files for each architecture/component of the well-known distributions Trisquel, Ubuntu, Debian and PureOS. Eventually I wrote scripts to automate this, which are now published in the debdistget project.
At this point, one of the early question about per-IP substitution of Release files were lingering in my mind. However with the tooling I now had available, coming up with a way to resolve this was simple! Merely have apt compute a SHA256 checksum of the just downloaded InRelease file, and see if my git repository had the same file. At this point I started reading the Apt source code, and now I had more doubts about the security of my systems than I ever had before. Oh boy how the name Apt has never before felt more… Apt?! Oh well, we must leave some exercises for the students. Eventually I realized I wanted to touch as little of apt code basis as possible, and noticed the SigVerify::CopyAndVerify function called ExecGPGV which called apt-key verify which called GnuPG’s gpgv. By setting Apt::Key::gpgvcommand I could get apt-key verify to call another tool than gpgv. See where I’m going? I thought wrapping this up would now be trivial but for some reason the hash checksum I computed locally never matched what was on my server. I gave up and started working on other things instead.
Today I came back to this idea, and started to debug exactly how the local files looked that I got from apt and how they differed from what I had in my git repositories, that came straight from the apt archives. Eventually I traced this back to SplitClearSignedFile which takes an InRelease file and splits it into two files, probably mimicking the (old?) way of distributing both Release and Release.gpg. So the clearsigned InRelease file is split into one cleartext file (similar to the Release file) and one OpenPGP signature file (similar to the Release.gpg file). But why didn’t the cleartext variant of the InRelease file hash to the same value as the hash of the Release file? Sadly they differ by the final newline.
Having solved this technicality, wrapping the pieces up was easy, and I came up with a project apt-canary that provides a script apt-canary-gpgv that verify the local apt release files against something I call a “apt canary witness” file stored at a URL somewhere.
I’m now running apt-canary on my Trisquel aramo laptop, a Trisquel nabia server, and Talos II ppc64el Debian machine. This means I have solved the per-IP substitution worries (or at least made them less likely to occur, having to send the same malicious release files to both GitLab and my system), and allow me to have an audit log of all release files that I actually use for installing and downloading packages.
What do you think? There are clearly a lot of work and improvements to be made. This is a proof-of-concept implementation of an idea, but instead of refining it until perfection and delaying feedback, I wanted to publish this to get others to think about the problems and various ways to resolve them.
Btw, I’m going to be at FOSDEM’23 this weekend, helping to manage the Security Devroom. Catch me if you want to chat about this or other things. Happy Hacking!
Ever wondered how Trisquel and Ubuntu differs and what’s behind the curtain from a developer perspective? I have. Sharing what I’ve learnt will allow you to increase knowledge and trust in Trisquel too.
Trisquel GNU/Linux logo
The scripts to convert an Ubuntu archive into a Trisquel archive are available in the ubuntu-purge repository. The easy to read purge-focal script lists the packages to remove from Ubuntu 20.04 Focal when it is imported into Trisquel 10.0 Nabia. The purge-jammy script provides the same for Ubuntu 22.04 Jammy and (the not yet released) Trisquel 11.0 Aramo. The list of packages is interesting, and by researching the reasons for each exclusion you can learn a lot about different attitudes towards free software and understand the desire to improve matters. I wish there were a wiki-page that for each removed package summarized relevant links to earlier discussions. At the end of the script there is a bunch of packages that are removed for branding purposes that are less interesting to review.
Trisquel adds a couple of Trisquel-specific packages. The source code for these packages are in the trisquel-packages repository, with sub-directories for each release: see 10.0/ for Nabia and 11.0/ for Aramo. These packages appears to be mostly for branding purposes.
Trisquel modify a set of packages, and here is starts to get interesting. Probably the most important package to modify is to use GNU Linux-libre instead of Linux as the kernel. The scripts to modify packages are in the package-helpers repository. The relevant scripts are in the helpers/ sub-directory. There is a branch for each Trisquel release, see helpers/ for Nabia and helpers/ for Aramo. To see how Linux is replaced with Linux-libre you can read the make-linux script.
This covers the basic of approaching Trisquel from a developers perspective. As a user, I have identified some areas that need more work to improve trust in Trisquel:
Auditing the Trisquel archive to confirm that the intended changes covered above are the only changes that are published.
Rebuild all packages that were added or modified by Trisquel and publish diffoscope output comparing them to what’s in the Trisquel archive. The goal would be to have reproducible builds of all Trisquel-related packages.
Publish an audit log of the Trisquel archive to allow auditing of what packages are published. This boils down to trust of the OpenPGP key used to sign the Trisquel archive.
Trisquel archive mirror auditing to confirm that they are publishing only what comes from the official archive, and that they do so timely.
I hope to publish more about my work into these areas. Hopefully this will inspire similar efforts in related distributions like PureOS and the upstream distributions Ubuntu and Debian.
I’m migrating some self-hosted virtual machines to Trisquel, and noticed that Trisquel does not offer cloud-images similar to the Debian Cloud and Ubuntu Cloud images. Thus my earlier approach based on virt-install --cloud-init and cloud-localds does not work with Trisquel. While I hope that Trisquel will eventually publish cloud-compatible images, I wanted to document an alternative approach for Trisquel based on preseeding. This is how I used to install Debian and Ubuntu in the old days, and the automated preseed method is best documented in the Debian installation manual. I was hoping to forget about the preseed format, but maybe it will become one of those legacy technologies that never really disappears? Like FAT16 and 8-bit microcontrollers.
Below I assume you have a virtual machine host server up that runs libvirt and has virt-install and similar tools; install them with the following command. I run Trisquel 11 aramo on my VM-host, but I believe any recent dpkg-based distribution like Trisquel 9/10, PureOS 10, Debian 11 or Ubuntu 20.04/22.04 would work with minor adjustments.
I have developed the following fairly minimal preseed file that works with all three Trisquel releases. Compare it against the official Trisquel 11 preseed skeleton and the Debian 11 example preseed file. You should modify obvious things like SSH key, host/IP settings, partition layout and decide for yourself how to deal with passwords. While Ubuntu/Trisquel usually wants to setup a user account, I prefer to login as root hence setting ‘passwd/root-login‘ to true and ‘passwd/make-user‘ to false.
Use the file above as a skeleton for preparing a VM-specific preseed file as follows. The environment variables HOST and IPS will be used later on too.
The following script is used to prepare the ISO images with the preseed file that we will need. This script is inspired by the Debian Wiki Preseed EditIso page and the Trisquel ISO customization wiki page. There are a couple of variations based on earlier works. Paths are updated to match the Trisquel netinst ISO layout, which differ slightly from Debian. We modify isolinux.cfg to boot the auto label without a timeout. On Trisquel 11 the auto boot label exists, but on Trisquel 9 and Trisquel 10 it does not exist so we add it in order to be able to start the automated preseed installation.
root@trana:~# cat gen-preseed-iso
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2018-2022 Simon Josefsson -- GPLv3+
# https://wiki.debian.org/DebianInstaller/Preseed/EditIso
# https://trisquel.info/en/wiki/customizing-trisquel-iso
set -e
set -x
ISO="$1"
PRESEED="$2"
OUTISO="$3"
LASTPWD="$PWD"
test -f "$ISO"
test -f "$PRESEED"
test ! -f "$OUTISO"
TMPDIR=$(mktemp -d)
mkdir "$TMPDIR/mnt"
mkdir "$TMPDIR/tmp"
cp "$PRESEED" "$TMPDIR"/preseed.cfg
cd "$TMPDIR"
mount "$ISO" mnt/
cp -rT mnt/ tmp/
umount mnt/
chmod +w -R tmp/
gunzip tmp/initrd.gz
echo preseed.cfg | cpio -H newc -o -A -F tmp/initrd
gzip tmp/initrd
chmod -w -R tmp/
sed -i "s/timeout 0/timeout 1/" tmp/isolinux.cfg
sed -i "s/default vesamenu.c32/default auto/" tmp/isolinux.cfg
if ! grep -q auto tmp/adtxt.cfg; then
cat<<EOF >> tmp/adtxt.cfg
label auto
menu label ^Automated install
kernel linux
append auto=true priority=critical vga=788 initrd=initrd.gz --- quiet
EOF
fi
cd tmp/
find -follow -type f | xargs md5sum > md5sum.txt
cd ..
cd "$LASTPWD"
genisoimage -r -J -b isolinux.bin -c boot.cat \
-no-emul-boot -boot-load-size 4 -boot-info-table \
-o "$OUTISO" "$TMPDIR/tmp/"
rm -rf "$TMPDIR"
exit 0
^D
root@trana:~# chmod +x gen-preseed-iso
root@trana:~#
Next run the command on one of the downloaded ISO image and the generated preseed file.
root@trana:~# ./gen-preseed-iso /root/iso/trisquel-netinst_10.0.1_amd64.iso vm-$HOST.preseed vm-$HOST.iso
+ ISO=/root/iso/trisquel-netinst_10.0.1_amd64.iso
+ PRESEED=vm-foo.preseed
+ OUTISO=vm-foo.iso
+ LASTPWD=/root
+ test -f /root/iso/trisquel-netinst_10.0.1_amd64.iso
+ test -f vm-foo.preseed
+ test ! -f vm-foo.iso
+ mktemp -d
+ TMPDIR=/tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9
+ mkdir /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/mnt
+ mkdir /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/tmp
+ cp vm-foo.preseed /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/preseed.cfg
+ cd /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9
+ mount /root/iso/trisquel-netinst_10.0.1_amd64.iso mnt/
mount: /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/mnt: WARNING: source write-protected, mounted read-only.
+ cp -rT mnt/ tmp/
+ umount mnt/
+ chmod +w -R tmp/
+ gunzip tmp/initrd.gz
+ echo preseed.cfg
+ cpio -H newc -o -A -F tmp/initrd
5 blocks
+ gzip tmp/initrd
+ chmod -w -R tmp/
+ sed -i s/timeout 0/timeout 1/ tmp/isolinux.cfg
+ sed -i s/default vesamenu.c32/default auto/ tmp/isolinux.cfg
+ grep -q auto tmp/adtxt.cfg
+ cat
+ cd tmp/
+ find -follow -type f
+ xargs md5sum
+ cd ..
+ cd /root
+ genisoimage -r -J -b isolinux.bin -c boot.cat -no-emul-boot -boot-load-size 4 -boot-info-table -o vm-foo.iso /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/tmp/
I: -input-charset not specified, using utf-8 (detected in locale settings)
Using GCRY_000.MOD;1 for /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/tmp/boot/grub/x86_64-efi/gcry_sha512.mod (gcry_sha256.mod)
Using XNU_U000.MOD;1 for /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/tmp/boot/grub/x86_64-efi/xnu_uuid.mod (xnu_uuid_test.mod)
Using PASSW000.MOD;1 for /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/tmp/boot/grub/x86_64-efi/password_pbkdf2.mod (password.mod)
Using PART_000.MOD;1 for /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/tmp/boot/grub/x86_64-efi/part_sunpc.mod (part_sun.mod)
Using USBSE000.MOD;1 for /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/tmp/boot/grub/x86_64-efi/usbserial_pl2303.mod (usbserial_ftdi.mod)
Using USBSE001.MOD;1 for /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/tmp/boot/grub/x86_64-efi/usbserial_ftdi.mod (usbserial_usbdebug.mod)
Using VIDEO000.MOD;1 for /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/tmp/boot/grub/x86_64-efi/videotest.mod (videotest_checksum.mod)
Using GFXTE000.MOD;1 for /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/tmp/boot/grub/x86_64-efi/gfxterm_background.mod (gfxterm_menu.mod)
Using GCRY_001.MOD;1 for /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/tmp/boot/grub/x86_64-efi/gcry_sha256.mod (gcry_sha1.mod)
Using MULTI000.MOD;1 for /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/tmp/boot/grub/x86_64-efi/multiboot2.mod (multiboot.mod)
Using USBSE002.MOD;1 for /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/tmp/boot/grub/x86_64-efi/usbserial_usbdebug.mod (usbserial_common.mod)
Using MDRAI000.MOD;1 for /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9/tmp/boot/grub/x86_64-efi/mdraid09.mod (mdraid09_be.mod)
Size of boot image is 4 sectors -> No emulation
22.89% done, estimate finish Thu Dec 29 23:36:18 2022
45.70% done, estimate finish Thu Dec 29 23:36:18 2022
68.56% done, estimate finish Thu Dec 29 23:36:18 2022
91.45% done, estimate finish Thu Dec 29 23:36:18 2022
Total translation table size: 2048
Total rockridge attributes bytes: 24816
Total directory bytes: 40960
Path table size(bytes): 64
Max brk space used 46000
21885 extents written (42 MB)
+ rm -rf /tmp/tmp.mNEprT4Tx9
+ exit 0
root@trana:~#
Now the image is ready for installation, so invoke virt-install as follows. For older virt-install (for example on Trisquel 10 nabia), replace --osinfo linux2020 with --os-variant linux2020.The machine will start directly, launching the preseed automatic installation. At this point, I usually click on the virtual machine in virt-manager to follow screen output until the installation has finished. If everything works OK the machines comes up and I can ssh into it.
root@trana:~# virt-install --name $HOST --disk vm-$HOST.img,size=5 --cdrom vm-$HOST.iso --osinfo linux2020 --autostart --noautoconsole --wait
Using linux2020 default --memory 4096
Starting install...
Allocating 'vm-foo.img' | 0 B 00:00:00 ...
Creating domain... | 0 B 00:00:00
Domain is still running. Installation may be in progress.
Waiting for the installation to complete.
Domain has shutdown. Continuing.
Domain creation completed.
Restarting guest.
root@trana:~#
There are some problems that I have noticed that would be nice to fix, but are easy to work around. The first is that at the end of the installation of Trisquel 9 and Trisquel 10, the VM hangs after displaying Sent SIGKILL to all processes followed by Requesting system reboot. I kill the VM manually using virsh destroy foo and start it up again using virsh start foo. For production use I expect to be running Trisquel 11, where the problem doesn’t happen, so this does not bother me enough to debug further.
Update 2023-03-21: The following issue was fixed between the final release of aramo and the pre-release of aramo that this blog post was originally written for, so the following no longer applies: The remaining issue that once booted, a Trisquel 11 VM has lost its DNS nameserver configuration, presumably due to poor integration with systemd-resolved. Both Trisquel 9 and Trisquel 10 uses systemd-resolved where DNS works after first boot, so this appears to be a Trisquel 11 bug. You can work around it with rm -f /etc/resolv.conf && echo 'nameserver A.B.C.D' > /etc/resolv.conf or drink the systemd Kool-Aid.
If you want to clean up and re-start the process, here is how you wipe out what you did. After this, you may run the sed, ./gen-preseed-iso and virt-install commands again. Remember, use virsh shutdown foo to gracefully shutdown a VM.
